On 27/11/2024 15:43, Stefano Brivio wrote:

...to quickly suppress a false positive from Coverity, which assumes that iov_size is 0 and 'dlen' might overflow as a result (with hdrlen being 66). An ASSERT() in tcp_vu_sock_recv() already guarantees that iov_size(iov, buf_cnt) here is anyway greater than 'hdrlen'.

Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio --- This applies on top of "[PATCH] Fix build on 32bit target"

tcp_vu.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/tcp_vu.c b/tcp_vu.c index 05e2d1d..a1510d9 100644 --- a/tcp_vu.c +++ b/tcp_vu.c @@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ int tcp_vu_data_from_sock(const struct ctx *c, struct tcp_tap_conn *conn) for (i = 0, check = NULL; i < head_cnt; i++) { struct iovec *iov = &elem[head[i]].in_sg[0]; int buf_cnt = head[i + 1] - head[i]; - int dlen = iov_size(iov, buf_cnt) - hdrlen; + ssize_t dlen = iov_size(iov, buf_cnt) - hdrlen;

vu_set_vnethdr(vdev, iov->iov_base, buf_cnt);

Reviewed-by: Laurent Vivier