On Wed, 7 Aug 2024 11:34:34 +0200 Paul Holzinger <pholzing(a)redhat.com> wrote:On 07/08/2024 10:27, Stefano Brivio wrote:Whoops.If a parent accidentally or due to implementation reasons leaks any open file, we don't want to have access to them, except for the file passed via --fd, if any. This is the case for Podman when Podman's parent leaks files into Podman: it's not practical for Podman to close unrelated files before starting pasta, as reported by Paul. Use close_range(2) to close all open files except for standard streams and the one from --fd. Given that parts of conf() depend on other files to be already opened, such as the epoll file descriptor, we can't easily defer this to a more convenient point, where --fd was already parsed. Introduce a minimal, duplicate version of --fd parsing to keep this simple. Suggested-by: Paul Holzinger <pholzing(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio(a)redhat.com> --- v2: Move call to close_open_files() to isolate_initial() conf.c | 1 + isolation.c | 12 +++++++++--- isolation.h | 2 +- passt.c | 2 +- util.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ util.h | 1 + 6 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/conf.c b/conf.c index 14d8ece..89f5b3d 100644 --- a/conf.c +++ b/conf.c @@ -1260,6 +1260,7 @@ void conf(struct ctx *c, int argc, char **argv) c->tcp.fwd_in.mode = c->tcp.fwd_out.mode = FWD_UNSET; c->udp.fwd_in.mode = c->udp.fwd_out.mode = FWD_UNSET; + optind = 1; do { name = getopt_long(argc, argv, optstring, options, NULL); diff --git a/isolation.c b/isolation.c index 4956d7e..45fba1e 100644 --- a/isolation.c +++ b/isolation.c @@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ * * Executed immediately after startup, drops capabilities we don't * need at any point during execution (or which we gain back when we - * need by joining other namespaces). + * need by joining other namespaces), and closes any leaked file we + * might have inherited from the parent process. * * 2. isolate_user() * ================= @@ -166,14 +167,17 @@ static void clamp_caps(void) } /** - * isolate_initial() - Early, config independent self isolation + * isolate_initial() - Early, mostly config independent self isolation + * @argc: Argument count + * @argv: Command line options: only --fd (if present) is relevant here * * Should: * - drop unneeded capabilities + * - close all open files except for standard streams and the one from --fd * Musn't: * - remove filesytem access (we need to access files during setup) */ -void isolate_initial(void) +void isolate_initial(int argc, char **argv) { uint64_t keep; @@ -207,6 +211,8 @@ void isolate_initial(void) keep |= BIT(CAP_SETFCAP) | BIT(CAP_SYS_PTRACE); drop_caps_ep_except(keep); + + close_open_files(argc, argv); } /** diff --git a/isolation.h b/isolation.h index 846b2af..80bb68d 100644 --- a/isolation.h +++ b/isolation.h @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ #ifndef ISOLATION_H #define ISOLATION_H -void isolate_initial(void); +void isolate_initial(int argc, char **argv); void isolate_user(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, bool use_userns, const char *userns, enum passt_modes mode); int isolate_prefork(const struct ctx *c); diff --git a/passt.c b/passt.c index ea5bece..4b3c306 100644 --- a/passt.c +++ b/passt.c @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) arch_avx2_exec(argv); - isolate_initial(); + isolate_initial(argc, argv); c.pasta_netns_fd = c.fd_tap = c.pidfile_fd = -1; diff --git a/util.c b/util.c index 07fb21c..bd65b5a 100644 --- a/util.c +++ b/util.c @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #include <errno.h> #include <stdbool.h> #include <linux/errqueue.h> +#include <getopt.h> #include "util.h" #include "iov.h" @@ -694,3 +695,38 @@ const char *str_ee_origin(const struct sock_extended_err *ee) return "<invalid>"; } + +/** + * close_open_files() - Close leaked files, but not --fd, stdin, stdout, stderr + * @argc: Argument count + * @argv: Command line options, as we need to skip any file given via --fd + */ +void close_open_files(int argc, char **argv) +{ + const struct option optfd[] = { { "fd", required_argument, NULL, 'F' }, + { 0 }, + }; + long fd = -1; + int name; + + do { + name = getopt_long(argc, argv, ":F", optfd, NULL); + + if (name == 'F') { + errno = 0; + fd = strtol(optarg, NULL, 0); + + if (fd < 0 || errno) + die("Invalid --fd: %s", optarg); + } + } while (name != -1); + + if (fd == -1) { + if (close_range(3, ~0U, CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE)) + die_perror("Failed to close files leaked by parent"); + } else { + if (close_range(3, fd - 1, CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE) || + close_range(fd + 1, ~0U, CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE)) + die_perror("Failed to close files leaked by parent");This will fail for fd == 3 as the first range is 3 - 2 in that case which causes EINVAL which could be a common choice for the extra passed fd.On the other end of the range it is the same issue, you seem to parse the fd as long so allows values > 4294967295 which then overflows when passed to close_range as uint which causes issues and even allows us to close stderr streams. Less likely that users would pass such a number but no reason to allow it in the first place.Of course. Nice catch as well. Thanks.$ strace -e close_range ./pasta --config-net --fd 4294967296 echo test close_range(3, 4294967295, CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE) = 0 close_range(1, 4294967295, CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE) = 0Hey, that's a cool feature! So much easier to type than >/dev/null. Sending v3. -- Stefano